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Corp. v. Granada Television, Ltd. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of journalists! to protect the confidentiality of their news sources by 
refusing to disclose the source in a court proceeding is an unsettled area of 
English law. 2 Courts and legislators in England must evaluate ajournalist's claim 
of confidentiality of news sources in light of the media's increasingly important 
role in society. 3 In recent years, journalists have urged that the news-gathering 
profession deserves a special privilege under the law. 4 In support of their claim, 
journalists point to the massive growth of the news media and its increased 
influence over the public. s Furthermore, in democratic nations journalists are 
viewed as a public watchdog against official abuse of power and therefore have 
adopted the status of the "fourth estate" among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government. 
The arguments for and against the claim that journalists should be privileged 
not to disclose confidential sources of information reflect two different public 
interests.6 Journalists claim that unless their informants can be assured that their 
identity will not be revealed, information concerning the government will not be 
available. 7 Journalists also urge that the public interest in a free press and a free 
I. In this Note, 'Journalists" refers to persons in both the print and broadcast media. 
2. This Note concerns English law. For a definition of English law, see D. WALKER, THE OXFORD 
COMPANlON To LAW 403 (1980). English law is contained in Acts of Parliament, statutory requirements 
(administrative regulations, rules, and orders) and reported cases. /d. at 403·11. 
The organization of English courts is as follows: The House of Lords serves a legislative function and 
as the final court of appeal for the United Kingdom in civil and criminal cases. /d. at 411·12. The 
Supreme Court of Judicature is divided into two parts, the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The 
Court of Appeal hears appeals from the High Court. Jd. The High Court consists of three divisions: 
Queen's Bench, Chancery, and Family Divisions. Jd. 
3. Goldsworthy, The Claim to Secrecy of News Source: A Journalistic Privilege?, 9 Os GOODE HALL L.J. 157 
(1971). 
4. Jd. at 158. 
5. /d. 
6. Jd. at 159. 
7. The Times (London), July 31, 1980, at 15, col. I. The Times of London expressed this view in an 
editorial. "Informants will be more wary of providing information to journalists fearing disclosure of 
their identity, and reporters, in turn, may no longer feel themselves confident in making promises of 
confidentiality." See also Goldsworthy, supra note 3, at 158-59. 
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flow of information outweighs the need for the disclosure of news sources. B 
Opponents of the privilege assert that despite the public interest in an unre-
stricted flow of information, the more important public interest lies in the due 
administration of justice: the source should be disclosed so as to afford plaintiffs 
a legal remedy against the source.9 This Note discusses the law in England 
relating to journalists' privilege not to disclose confidential sources of informa-
tion. First, this Note traces the historical development of the Newspaper Rule, 
which first enabled English journalists to successfully assert the privilege. The 
author then examines three cases which rejected this common law development, 
the so-called "Vassall Inquiry Cases." The author then analyzes several British 
government publications concerning the press. The publications are the equiva-
lent of congressional debates in the United States and offer insight into the 
rationale of judicial decisions on the issue of whether journalists are privileged 
not to disclose confidential news sources. tO The Note then analyzes the most 
recent English case concerning the law of disclosure, British Steel Corp. v. Granada 
Television, Ltd. 11 In British Steel, the courts considered whether journalists may 
protect the confidentiality of their news sources by refusing to disclose the source 
despite a court order compelling disclosure. The case rejected the claim that 
journalists are privileged in law to refuse to disclose news sources. Although 
there is little precedent indicating that journalists have a legal privilege not to 
disclose their sources, this Note concludes that courts in England nevertheless 
are reluctant to force journalists to disclose sources of information. If a right not 
to disclose is to be recognized in England, the author theorizes that the right 
should belong to the confidential source, not to the journalist. 
II. THE NEWSPAPER RULE 
In England, a court will not order the disclosure of a confidential source of 
information during the discovery stage of defamation cases against journalists 
and newspapers,l2 Consequently, courts will not allow an interrogatory as to the 
journalist'S source. 13 This rule is known as the "Newspaper Rule."14 The Rule 
represents a judicial determination that it is not in the public interest that the 
name of an informant be disclosed when a plaintiff seeking the name of that 
source has an adequate remedy in damages against the newspaper without 
8. See, e.g., N. BAKER, REpORTERS' PRIVILEGE WORLDWIDE 4 (University of Missouri Freedom of 
Information Center Publication No. 116, February, 1964) (citing views of Dr. Fred S. Seibert). 
9. Goldsworthy, supra note 3, at 159. 
10. A. CHLOROS, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE CHANNEL 
ISLANDS AND THE ISLE OF MAN 5 (2d ed. 1973). 
II. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774. 
12. Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. Illl, 1115 (1960). 
13. Id. 
14. British Steel Corp. v. Granada Television Ltd., [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774, 825. 
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disclosure of the source. 15 The Rule is contained in a rule of the Supreme 
CourtI6 and exists as a result of recommendations by the Porter Committee on 
the Law of Defamation. 17 
The Porter Committee believed that the plaintiff's legitimate interests are 
adequately satisfied by the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the defendant 
journalist as to the identity of an informant. 18 One commentator has charac-
terized the Rule as "small and curious" because it applies only in defamation 
cases. 19 Wigmore has described the Newspaper Rule as an exceptional practice, 
attributable to the special status of libel actions in English social life, which 
exempts a newspaper publisher, in an action of libel, from disclosing the identity 
of his informant. 2o Apart from Wigmore's analysis, the Newspaper Rule is 
scarcely mentioned in any of the leading English treatises on the law of evi-
dence.21 Nonetheless, the Rule is important since journalists have attempted to 
stretch its applicability to non-defamation cases, forcing the courts to evaluate 
the entire disclosure issue.22 
The Newspaper Rule originated in the 1888 case of Hennessy v. Wright (No. 
2),23 in which the publisher of The Times of London was sued for libel. The 
defendant pleaded fair comment24 and that the publication was made under 
circumstances giving rise to a qualified privilege.25 The Court of Appeal refused 
to order the defendant to answer certain interrogatories involving disclosure of 
the names of confidential sources of information. It did so because it felt that the 
identity of the informants was irrelevant to the libel charge.26 The importance of 
the case lies in the fact that it was decided in terms of relevance and not in terms 
of whether journalists were privileged in law not to disclose sources of informa-
tion.27 
15. ld. at 803. 
16. Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, Ord. 82, r. 6. The rule states: 
In an action for libel or slander where the defendant pleads that the words or matters 
complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest or were published on a 
privileged occasion, no interrogatories as to the defendant's source of information or grounds 
for belief shall be allowed. 
/d. 
17. REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAw OF DEFAMATION, CMD. 7536, at 42-43 (1948). 
18.ld. 
19. Carter, supra note 12, at 1115. 
20. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 537 n.13 (3d ed. 1940). 
21. Carter, supra note 12, at 1115. 
22. See infra § III. 
23. [1888] 24 Q.B. 445. 
24. Fair comment is defined as "[a] term used in the law of libel, applying to statements made by the 
writer in an honest belief of their truth ... even though the statements are not true in fact." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 536 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
25. Hennessy v. Wright (No.2), [1888] 24 Q.B. 445. 
26. ld. at 447-48. 
27. ld. at 447. 
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In Gibson v. Evans,28 the Hennessy rule was followed. The court in Gibson, 
considering the issue of disclosure of confidential sources as one of relevance, 
excused the defendant newspaper publisher from revealing in answers to inter-
rogatories the author of an allegedly libelous letter published in the news-
paper. 29 Later, in Hope v. Brash,30 the Court of Appeal applied the Hennessy rule 
and excused a newspaper proprietor from producing the contributor's original 
manuscript for inspection. In 1902, however, in Elliott v. Garrett,31 the Court of 
Appeal, again treating the matter as one of relevance, allowed an interrogatory 
requiring the defendant, who was not part of the press, to disclose his source of 
information. Although the action was for slander, the court did not limit the 
Hennessy rule as protecting exclusively newspaper publishers. 32 Instead, the 
court accepted the Newspaper Rule as being based solely upon considerations of 
relevance. 33 
This approach was followed three years later in the libel action of White & Co. 
v. Credit Reform Ass'n & Credit Index, Ltd. 34 Defendants, who again were not 
affiliated with the press, pleaded qualified privilege in law not to disclose their 
source of information. Again, the court treated the issue as one of relevance and 
not privilege, allowing interrogatories and requiring the defendants to disclose 
the identity of their informants.35 
In 1906, however, the basis of the Newspaper Rule began to shift from 
relevance to privilege. 36 In Plymouth Mutual Co-operative & Industrial Society, Ltd. 
v. Traders' Publishing Ass'n Ltd.,37 a libel action against the publishers of a trade 
journal, the defendants pleaded fair comment. 38 The Court of Appeal allowed 
the defendants not to answer an interrogatory concerning the identity of their 
informants. 39 The court indicated that privilege was the more accurate basis for 
the Newspaper Rule. 40 The court felt that the relevance of ajournalist's answer 
concerned the libel litigation itself, and not the privilege issue which may arise 
during the libel suit. 41 The court regarded Hennessy as establishing a rule that in 
libel cases the court should not compel disclosure of a journalist's confidential 
source of information at the interrogatory stage of litigation. 42 
28. [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 384. 
29. Id. at 386-87. 
30. [1897] 2 Q.B. 188. 
31. [1902] 1 K.B. 870. 
32. Carter, supra note 12, at 1116. 
33. Id. 
34. [1905] 1 K.B. 653. 
35. Id. at 657-60. 
36. Carter, supra note 12, at 1117. 
37. [1906] 1 K.B. 403. 
38.Id. 
39. Id. at 403-04. 
40. /d. at 407. See also Carter,supra note 12, at 1117. 
41. Plymouth Mutual Coop. & Indus. Soc'y v. Traders Publishing Ass'n, [1906] 1 K.B. 403, 407. 
42. Id. at 407. 
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Eight years later, in Adam v. Fisher,43 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
newspaper publishers had achieved a special position in the law. 44 The court 
held that judges could exercise discretion to refuse to allow the defendant in a 
libel case to be interrogated as to the source of information or to require 
disclosure of a source.45 The Court of Appeal wrote that the factors which a 
judge should weigh in exercising discretion were whether the plaintiff sought 
disclosure of the source merely to sue the informant, which was seen as an 
improper reason since damages could be recovered from the newspaper, or 
whether the plaintiff sought disclosure in order to establish malice. The court 
viewed this as a proper ground for ordering disclosure. 46 
In Lyle-Samuel v. Ollhams, Ltd.,47 however, the court accepted the Newspaper 
Rule and the privilege it afforded journalists -not to disclose confidential 
sources.48 Finally, in South Suburban Co-operative Society, Ltd. v. Orum,49 the Court 
of Appeal refused to extend the Newspaper Rule to the writer of a letter 
published in a newspaper, finding that the Rule was the exclusive privilege of 
newspaper publishers and journalists.50 The court indicated that the "special 
newspaper immunity" did not rest on any principle of law, but instead was an 
exception in the law.51 
The Newspaper Rule is limited in scope in that it applies only in libel suits. 
Furthermore, it applies only at the interrogatory stage of litigation. 52 Thus, a 
newspaper editor cannot claim a privilege not to disclose a confidential source of 
information at the trial stage of a libel action. 53 This was established in McGuin-
ness v. the Attorney-General of Victoria,54 an Australian decision which influenced 
the courts in England.55 McGuinness expressly distinguished the earlier English 
Newspaper Rule cases as being concerned with interlocutory matters and not the 
trial of an action.56 
43. [1914) 110 T.L.R. 288. 
44. ld. at 288-89. 
45. ld. 
46. ld. at 288. 
47. [1920) I K.B. 135. 
48. The judge, Bankes, was at a loss to find a justification for the Newspaper Rule. He stated: 
All I say is that this is an action of libel against the publishers of a newspaper, that it is well 
established that in the case of newspapers there is an exception to the rule requiring a 
defendant to disclose the source of his information where he pleads either privilege or fair 
comment. 
ld. at 143. 
49. [1937) 2 K.B. 690. 
50. ld. at 703. 
51. Carter, supra note 12, at 1118. 
52. ld. at 1119. 
53. See, e.g., Plymouth Mutual [1906) I K.B. at 418. 
54. [1940) Argus L.R. 110. 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
56. McGuinness v. Attorney-General of Victoria [1940) Argus L.R. 110, 120. 
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The Newspaper Rule represents ajudicial willingness to permit silence in libel 
actions when the effect of an answer to an interrogatory would force a journalist 
to disclose confidential sources. 57 The Rule may be based more upon the desira-
bility of protecting contributors of information from unnecessary disclosure of 
their names than on protecting journalists, since the informant is not a party to 
the litigation in libel actions.58 
Ill. V ASSALL INQUIRY CASES 
The disclosure issue next arose in Britain in the early 1960s in the "Vassall 
Inquiry Cases"59 when journalists refused to disclose confidential sources of 
information to the British government and the courts. The cases highlight the 
limitations of the Newspaper'Rule60 and expand the principle that it is within the 
discretion of the court to order disclosure at the trial stage of litigation.61 
In the Vassall Inquiry Cases, journalists wrote "sensational"62 newspaper arti-
cles concerning the trial of British admiralty clerk Williams Vassal!. Vassall faced 
charges, under the Official Secrets Acts of 1911,63 of breaching national security 
arrangements by spying for foreign governments.64 Two journalists, Mulholland 
and Foster, accused the British government of neglecting its official duty in not 
ascertaining that Vassall was working as a spy for foreign governments. 65 A third 
journalist, Clough, asserted that Vassall's spying led to Soviet trawler fleets 
spying in the area of secret NATO sea exercises. 66 
Due to the controversial nature of these newspaper articles, the British gov-
ernment established a tribunal to inquire into the articles under provisions of the 
Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) ACt.67 The tribunal was to inquire into whether 
57. Goldsworthy, supra note 3, at 161-62. 
58. [d. at 162. 
59. The cases are Attorney-General v. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. 343; Attorney-General v. Mulhol-
land, Attorney-General v. Foster, [1963]2 W.L.R. 658 (reported together). The cases received the name 
"Vassall Inquiry cases" because the subject of the journalists' articles was a British admiralty official 
William Vassall, and the government inquired as to the journalists' sources of information concerning 
Vassallo See Tapper, Freedom and Privilege, 26 MOD. L. REv. 571 (1963). 
60. See supra § II. 
61. Tapper, supra note 59, at 574. 
62. [d. at 571. 
63. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28 (1911). 
64. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 345 
65. Mulholland, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 662-63. 
66. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 345. 
67. Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, ch. 7 [hereinafter cited as Tribunals 
of Inquiry Act]. The Act provides: 
Where it has been resolved ... by both Houses of Parliament that it is expedient that a 
tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter described in the Resolution as of 
urgent public importance, and in pursuance of the Resolution a tribunal is appointed for the 
purpose ... the tribunal shall have all such powers, rights, and privileges as are vested in the 
High Court ... in respect of ... enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them ... 
and compelling the production of documents. 
[d. § 1. 
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the allegations made by the journalists were true. 6B Over one hundred wit-
nesses,69 including Clough, Mulholland, and Foster,70 were questioned by the 
tribunal. The tribunal asked all three journalists to reveal the sources of their 
news articles. 71 The journalists, however, refused to disclose what they asserted 
were confidential sources of information. 72 Consequently, the journalists faced 
suit for contempt of court under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act. 73 The 
journalists argued before the Tribunal that the names of their sources were not 
relevant to the Tribunal and that, even if relevant, the journalists had a privilege 
in law not to disclose their confidential sources of information. 74 The Tribunal 
disagreed, however, holding that the information was relevant and that no 
privilege excused the journalists from disclosing the sources. 75 The Tribunal felt 
that it had the discretion to order disclosure and would accept the privilege claim 
only if it were able to obtain the desired information from other witnesses. 76 The 
Tribunal therefore certified the case to the court. 77 
In the Clough case, the court agreed with the Tribunal, holding that the name 
of the source was relevant and that Clough had no privilege in law to refuse to 
disclose his source. 78 Chief Justice Parker cited two reasons for rejecting 
Clough's argument that the Newspaper Rule protected Clough from disclosing 
his source. First, no public policy existed that would justify applying the Rule to 
the Clough case. Second, recognizing a privilege would impede the discovery of 
truth and the due administration of the law. 79 The court concluded that Clough 
The Act further provides that the Chairman of the Tribunal may certify to the High Court that a 
witness has refused to answer a question to which the Tribunal may legally require an answer, and the 
court after inquiring into the alleged ollense, and after hearing any witnesses and statement that may be 
offered in defense, may "punish ... that person in like manner as if he had been guilty of contempt of 
the court." [d. 
68. REpORT OF THE TRIBUNAL ApPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE V ASSALL CASE AND RELATED MATTERS, 
CMND. No. 2009, at iii (1963). 
69. [d. at 2. 
70. [d. at 5. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. See Tribunals of Inquiry Act, supra note 67. 
74. Tapper, supra note 59, at 572. 
75. REpORT OF THE TRIBUNAL ApPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE VASSALL CASE AND RELATED MATTERS, 
CMND. No. 2009 at 5 (1963). The report stated that since the Tribunal was unable to examine the 
sources, it was unable to obtain direct information so as to satisfy the Tribunal as to the truth or falsity of 
the news articles; therefore, it could not accept claims of professional privilege. !d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at I. The Tribunal took this step according to the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, supra note 67. 
78. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 343-44. A summary of the court's holding may be found in 107 Sol. J. 
96 (1963). 
79. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 348-52. 
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was in contempt of court for refusing to disclose his source to the tribunal. 
However, if Clough later disclosed the source, or if the tribunal obtained the 
information from some other individual, then the court could justify the remis-
sion of his jail sentence. BO Subsequently, Clough's source disclosed himself to the 
tribunal, thus freeing Clough from his obligation of confidence and a jail sen-
tence for contempt. 81 This decision marked the limits to which the Newspaper 
RuleB2 could be applied. Chief Justice Parker held that the Rule only applied to 
the interlocutoryB3 stage of a law suit and not to the trial of an action, and he 
relied upon the Australian case of McGuinness v. Attorney-General of Victoria B4 to 
support this conclusion. 85 Parker also stated that although journalists could not 
refuse to disclose the names of their sources, the court nevertheless has discre-
tion to permit non-disclosure in cases where the Rule may apply.86 Parker 
dismissed Clough's contention that the Rule applies to all cases because public 
policy demands that journalists be immune from disclosing sources; he held 
instead that in this case it was more important that the Tribunal have the name 
of the source. B7 
In the Mulholland and Foster cases, Lord Denning expanded upon the principle 
that the court has discretion to order disclosure. B8 Lord Denning stated that 
judges must weigh the conflicting interests which encompass the disclosure issue, 
and if the judge determines that a journalist must disclose a source, then the 
journalist has no privilege to withhold a name.B9 The court also held that the 
Newspaper Rule did not apply to Mulholland and Foster since the public interest 
demanded disclosure of the sources and there was no rule of law, despite the 
Newspaper Rule, allowing journalists to withhold their sources at trial. 90 Den-
ning developed the concept that responsible newspapers and journalists may 
deserve protection from the courts on the disclosure issue. The only way for the 
court to ascertain the degree of responsibility91 exercised by Mulholland and 
Foster, however, was to know the names of their sources. 92 Mulholland and 
80. ld. at 353. 
81. 107 Sol. J. 96 (1963). 
82. See supra § II. 
83. Black's Law Dictionary defines "interlocutory stage" as "[s]omething intervening between the 
commencement and end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the 
whole controversy." BLACK'S LAW D1CTlONARV 731 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
84. [1940] Argus L.R. 110. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
85. Clough, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 351. 
86. ld. at 349. 
87. ld. at 352-53. 
88. Mulholl1l1ui, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 663-67. 
89. ld. 
90. ld. at 659-65. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. Lord Denning's critique of a responsible press is important, for he later relied upon it to 
explain his decision in the British Steel case. See infra § VI. One commentator has suggested that Lord 
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Foster received three and six month jail sentences respectively for refusing to 
disclose their sources. 93 Parliament debated their sentences shortly after the 
Court of Appeal decision. The debates, however, did not result in any changes in 
the law concerning court-ordered disclosure of journalists' confidential sources 
of information. 94 
IV. GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
The British government has published many reports regarding the press.95 
The reports consist of bills and documents published by Royal Commissions and 
Parliamentary Committees. 96 The reports often provide the rationale for judicial 
decisions and may be cited in court to show the previous state of the law and its 
defects.97 In one Command Paper entitled Rayal Commission on Tribunals of 
Inquiry, the Commission reviewed the power of a Tribunal to force ajournalist to 
disclose a source. 98 The Commission did not recommend a change in the law 
concerning disclosure of news sources.99 It concluded instead that the law clearly 
requires that witnesses before Tribunals of Inquiry should, in the national 
Denning should not have created, and then adopted, the principle that judges have discretion to order 
disclosure sinct: judicial discretion may confuse the law of disclosure: 
The apparently universal view that the court has a discretion in each case ... is less acceptable. 
There is an increasing tendency in the modern law of evidence to leave everything to the 
judges. It is suggested that in the law of evidence, perhaps more than in any other branch of 
the law it is essential that justice be seen to be done. This will be impossible unless the rules are 
readily accessible and clearly stated. Every effort should be made to make all relevant evidence 
admissible. The creation of a new and undefined exclusionary discretion seems a step in the 
wrong direction. 
Tapper, supra note 59, at 574. 
93. Mullholland, [1963] 2 W.L.R. at 659. 
94. See 647 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th seLl 682 (1963). An eyewitness to the debates states that the 
Attorney-General who prosecuted the journalists faced a "testy and aroused" House of Commons in an 
"attack" led by one member of Parliament. See Gottesman, Letter from London, 18 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 
371 (1963). Some members of Parliament felt that requiring disclosure of journalists' sources meant the 
destruction of a free press in Britain, 647 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 682, 698-99 (1963); however there 
was no universal opinion on this question. Id. at 701. 
95. For a summary of the reports, see R.c. SMITH, PRESS LAW (1978). See also ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
THE PREss (1947-1949), REPORT, CMND. No. 7700 (1949); ROYAL CoMMISSION ON THE PREss (1961-
1962), REpORT, CMND. No. 18Il (1962). 
96. See D. WALKER, THE OXFORD CoMPANION TO LAw 931 (1980). Some government reports are 
required by law to be given to Parliament (Act Papers), others are ordered to be printed by Parliament 
(House of Lords Papers, House of Commons Papers), and others are ordered to be printed by the 
departments of Parliament concerned with the subject matter of the report (Command Papers). 
Command Papers are presented to Parliament by a minister of the Crown, legally by command of Her 
M.yesty. They include reports on the work of government departments, evidence to and reports of 
Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees, and materials relative to matters of policy which 
may be the basis for debate or legislation. /d. 
97. See Brief for British Steel [1980] 2 W.L.R. 774 at 3. The House of Lords discussed the reports in 
the British Steel decision. See infra § V. 
98. ROYAL CoMMISSION ON TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY, CMND. No. 3121 (1966). 
99. Id. at 42. 
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interest, disclose confidential sources of information if the Tribunal considers 
the source vital to its inquiry.loo 
In 1977, a report by the Royal Commission on the PresslOI made no reference 
to the protection of press sources from court-ordered disclosure,102 nor was 
there any evidence in the report suggesting that recommendations were made to 
the Commission for a change in the law relating to disclosure.lo3 However, the 
report did discuss the tensions which exist in Britain, as a result of government 
intervention in the press. I04 In Britain, two other Royal Commissions on the 
Press also have been published. l05 The reports did not discuss the disclosure 
issue, but the fact that within a thirty-year period three such Commissions have 
studied and published reports on the press reflects the British government's 
anxiety over the power of the press.106 
In 1974, the Phillimore Committee on Contempt of Courtl07 considered the 
question whether journalists are privileged not to disclose confidential sources of 
information. lOS The Committee's report recommended no change in the law as 
it existed after the Clough, Mulholland, and Foster cases. 109 The Committee ana-
lyzed the disclosure issue in terms of the law of contempt of court under which 
Clough, Mulholland, and Foster were adjudged guiltyYo The Committee stated 
100. Id. at 41. The Tribunal stated: "In the ultimate analysis, it is unthinkable that a great institution 
such as the Press would seek to defy the law." Id. 
101. RoYAL CoMMISSION ON THE PREss, FINAL REPoRT, CMND. No. 6810 (1977). The Commission 
was established to study the economic factors affecting the press and press editorial standards in Britain. 
Id. at 2. 
102. Id. at 183. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 9. The intervention consists of government ownership of some media and, in some 
instances, strict censorship. Id. For a recent analysis of tensions which arise due to government 
censorship, see The Handling of the Press and Public Information During the Falklands Conflict, Session 
1981-82, House of Commons, Defense Committee Uuly 21, 1982). 
105. See RoYAL CoMMISSION ON THE PREss (1947-1949), REPoRT, CMND. No. 7700 (1949); ROYAL 
CoMMISSION ON THE PREss 1961-1962), REPORT, CMND. No. 1811 (1962). 
106. RoYAL CoMMISSION ON THE PREss, FINAL REPoRT, CMND. No. 6810, at I (1977). The publica-
tions of the Royal Commission on the Press are numerous. See, e.g., INTERIM REpORT, THE NATIONAL 
NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY, CMND. No. 6433 (1976); INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER 
INDUSTRY, A REpORT BY THE ADVISORY CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION SERVICE RESEARCH SERIES I, 
CMND. No. 6680 (1976); INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL 
INDUSTRIES, A REpORT BY THE ADVISORY CoNCILIATION AND ARBITRATION SERVICE RESEARCH SERIES 2, 
CMND. No. 6810-2 (1977); ATTITUDES TO THE PREss, A REPORT BY SoCIAL AND CoMMUNITY PLANNING 
RESEARCH SERIES 3, CMND. No. 6810-3 (1977); ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER CoNTENT RESEARCH 
SERIES 4, CMND. No. 6810-4 (1977); CoNCENTRATION OF OwNERSHIP IN THE PROVINCIAL PREss RE-
SEARCH SERIES 5, CMND. No. 6810-5 (1977); PERIODICALS AND THE ALTERNATIVE PREss RESEARCH 
SERIES 6, CMND. No. 6810-6 (1977). 
107. REPORT OF THE PHILLIMORE CoMMITTEE ON CoNTEMPT OF CoURT, CMND. No. 5794 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as PHILLIMORE CoMMITTEE). 
108. Id. at 18. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. For an analysis of the law of contempt in Britain, see R.C. SMITH, PRESS LAw 92-94 (1978). 
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that the law of disclosure was a question of evidence which had been previously 
considered by the Law Reform Committee. llI 
The Law Reform Committee112 had stated in 1967 that it was satisfied with the 
policy, developed in the Vas sail Inquiry Cases, of allowing the court the discre-
tion to order disclosure of journalists' confidential sources of information. 113 
The Law Reform Committee rejected replacing judicial discretion with a com-
prehensive statutory classification of privileges.114 The Committee stated that 
statutory classifications of privileges would not be in the interest of justice 
because courts would not be able to impose limitations concerning the use of 
information disclosed to a particular party, whereas ajudge using discretion may 
order that the disclosed information cannot be used outside of the particular 
proceedings in which it is disclosed.ll5 The Committee believed that judicial 
discretion, as developed in the Vassall Inquiry Cases, allowing a witness to refuse 
to disclose information if disclosure would force the witness to breach an ethical 
or social value,116 would not result in injustice to the party seeking the informa-
tion.117 The Committee defined "injustice" as instances when a party seeking 
disclosure of information is unable to obtain the information and consequently 
may be unable to ascertain facts relevant to an issue which that party is litigat-
ing. lIs The Committee discussed other privileges not to disclose information 
recognized by English law, such as the privilege against self-incrimination.u 9 
The Committee did not, however, mention a journalist's claim to a similar 
privilege. 12o 
The government reports have never recommended extending to journalists 
the privilege to refuse to disclose sources of information.121 The reports are 
important because they influence judicial decisions.122 The reports also reflect 
Ill. I'HILUMoRE COMMITTEE, supra note 107, at 18. 
112. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, SIXTEENTH REpORT (PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS), CMND. No. 
3472 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LAw REFORM CoMMITTEE]. The Committee publishes government 
reports. 
113. [d. at 3. 
114. [d. 
115. [d. 
116. For an analysis of other ethical and social values involved with the law of disclosure, see BREACH 
OF CONFIDENCE (Law Commission Working Paper No. 58, 1974). 
117. LAw REFORM CoMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 3. 
118. /d. 
119. /d. at 5-8. The Committee discussed other examples of recognized privileges not to disclose 
information such as in aid of litigation, in aid of settlement and conciliation, concerning husband and 
wife, priest and penitent, and doctor and patient. [d. at 8-22. 
120. This may be explained by the fact that no news media appear in the list of organizations and 
individuals submitting evidence to the Committee. See LAw REFORM CoMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 24. A 
commentator suggests that one reason why the Committee did not recommend extending the privilege 
to journalists was the desirability of keeping the number of recognized privileges at a minimum. See 
Goldsworthy, supra note 3, at 159. 
121. Goldsworthy, supra note 3, at 159. 
122. [d. 
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the history of the law of disclosure. 123 When Granada Television attempted to 
withhold its source of information from British Steel despite disclosure orders, it 
faced government reports and case precedent which indicated that journalists 
have no legal right to refuse to disclose sources of information. 
v. BRITISH STEEL CORP. v. GRANADA TELEVISION LTD. 
In 1980, the English courts again considered the issue of court-ordered disclo-
sure of journalists' confidential sources of information. British Steel Corporation v. 
Granada Television, Ltd. 124 prompted the courts to review the entire law of 
disclosure. Their review indicated that despite earlier case law and numerous 
government reports, the law of disclosure was in turmoip25 due primarily to the 
fact that judges have broad discretion to order disclosure. However, despite the 
lengthy British Steel decision,126 the law of disclosure in England remams con-
fused. 127 
A. Factual Background 
For several years the government-owned l28 British Steel Corporation (B.S.C.) 
was in perilous financial condition, with closures, strikes, and a record for poor 
productivity and staggering losses. 129 For years, the corporation was the source 
of ridicule in the British press. l3O Then, on February 4, 1980, during the first 
national steel strike by B.S.C. employees since 1926,131 the Granada Television 
Company aired a program about the strike. 132 A few days before the program, 
called "World in Action," a Granada reporter received copies of 250 secret and 
confidential documents from B.S.C.'s files. The documents dealt with high-level 
123.Id. 
124. (1980) 3 W.L.R. 774. 
125. Granada - An Intolerable ConfusWn, 130 NEW L.J. 1053 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Confusion). 
126. See British Steel, (1980) 3 W.L.R. 774-845. The decision covers eighty pages of the Weekly Law 
Reports. 
127. Confusion, supra note 125, at 1053. Lord Denning, a Court of Appeal judge in the British Steel 
case, characterized the decision as "[t)he most controversial case of modern times." A. DENNING, WHAT 
NEXT IN THE LAW 246 (1982). 
128. The British Steel Corporation (B.S.C.) is a nationalized corporation. See Affidavit of D.S. 
Laughton, Appendix at 8, British Steel Corp. v. Granada Television, (1980) 3 W.L.R. 774 [hereinafter 
cited as Appendix). The appendix was supplied by Clifford-Turner & Co., which represented B.S C. 
129. Nichol, British Ste.l Corporation v. Granada: Naming Moles, PUB. LAW 163, 163 (1981). 
130. Telephone interview with Ronald Melvin, Director of Public Relations of the British Steel 
Corporation (October 20, 1982). Mr. Melvin also stated: "If any journalist wanted to pick on us, we were 
there to be picked on. And we were constantly picked on. [The Granada Television Company's) abuse 
of stolen documents was the last straw and we had to stop it. The program was inept - they tried to 
show malfeasance, but it didn't come off. We sued to recover our property and to stop other journalists 
from doing the same. The proof of the pudding was that we won on an levels. . . . Investigative 
journalism is a cheap and easy way for journalists to make a name for themselves." Id. 
131. Appendix, supra note 128, at 8. For a description of the 1980 Steel Strike, see Dupont Steel Ltd. 
v. Sirs, (1980) 1 W.L.R. 142. 
132. British Steel, (1980) 3 W.L.R. 774. 
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discussions and actions within B.S.C. and discussions between B.S.C. and the 
government. 133 
Granada never solicited the documents; the materials were obtained from an 
unofficial source who was apparently a B.S.C. employee. 134 The documents 
reflected poorly on the management of B.S.C. 135 Granada's feature news story, 
entitled "The Steel Papers," included a number of quotations made by the 
Secretary of State for Industry and a live interview with Sir Charles ViIliers, 
Chairman of B.S.C.136 The program advanced the view that B.S.C.'s declining 
productivity resulted from not only the poor productivity of steel workers, but 
also from poor management and government intervention. 137 The documents 
played a key role in the program, with some "secret" documents broadcast to 
viewers.138 B.S.C. never consented to the documents being given to Granada or 
being used by them in any way.139 
On February 5, the day after the broadcast, B.S.C. sent Granada a telex stating 
that the documents were confidential and that publication was a breach of 
confidence14o and a breach of B.S.C.'s copyright in them.141 Therefore, in a 
notice of motion on February 6, 1980, B.S.C. demanded that Granada cease 
publication of the documents and return the documents to B.S.C.142 Granada 
133. Appendix, supra note 128, at 8. 
134. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774. 
135. Appendix, supra note 128, at 8. 
136. Before interviewing Sir Charles, the reporter dramatized the steel papers. He said: 
Last week a number of documents came into the possession of World in Action. They are 
letters, memos and internal reports from B.S.C. They were drawn up over the last five years 
and none of them was ever intended for publication. Tonight we examine these papers and the 
new light they appear to throw on the corporation strategy and the Government's declared 
policy of non-intervention. 
British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 800. 
Then, during his interview with Sir Charles Villiers, the B.S.C. Chairman, the reporter stated: 
"Several documents have your officials and executives referring to the fact that they have to consult the 
Government on this and on that. Does that not make it sound a little strange [given the government's 
policy of non-intervention] in the steel dispute?" Sir Charles Villiers replied: "I don't know what 
documents you're referring to and we shall see perhaps before long." [d. 
137. /d. at 780. 
138. [d. B.S.C. claimed that publication of the documents would damage B.S.C. in its business in 
general, as well as in its relations with its employees. Appendix, supra note 128, at 8. 
139. Appendix, supra note 128, at 5. See also British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 780-81. 
140. See BREACH OF CONFIDENCE supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
[d. 
141. Appendix, supra note 128, at 15. In the telex, B.S.C.'s Director of Legal Services stated: 
I do not know how you (Granada) obtained possession of the B.S.C. documents. However, 
you certainly did not receive the B.S.C. documents with the consent or approval or knowledge 
of B.S.C. In the circumstances your possession of the B.S.C. documents is unlawful, your 
publication of the B.S.C. documents is a breach of confidence and a breach of copyright. 
142. Notice of Motion in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. Appendix, supra note 128, 
at 4. 
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refused to comply143 with B.S.C.'s demands.144 On the same day the Chancery 
Division, Oliver J., granted an ex parte injunction restraining the publication or 
reproduction of the documents. 145 Granada officials subsequently delivered the 
documents to B.S.C. but, upon examination,-B.S.C. discovered that many of the 
documents were mutilated, making it impossible for B.S.C. to determine the 
identity of the person responsible for giving the documents to Granada. 146 
Consequently, on March 6, 1980, B.S.C. issued a notice of motion against 
Granada ordering that Granada supply B.S.C. with an "affadavit setting forth 
the names of all persons responsible for supplying them [Granada] with or who 
have offered to supply them with documents being the property of the plaintiffs 
or with any copies thereof."147 
B. Chancery Division Holding 
Granada refused to comply with B.S.C.'s motion of March 6, 1980, and 
consequently B.S.C. sued Granada in the Chancery Division.148 In defense, 
Granada contended that it did not have to disclose its source of information to 
B.S.C. Granada's arguments were that Granada was protected against B.S.C.'s 
demands for disclosure of its source by the privilege against self-incrimination149 
143. In response to B.S.C.'s demands, Granada stated in a telex: 
We have no immediate plans to repeat our World in Action programme. We would of course 
reserve our rights to deal with this programme in a similar manner to other Granada pro-
grammes but agree without prejudice to take no further action as requested for 72 hours to 
allow consultation and consideration. 
Id. at 16. 
144. Id. Granada's reply was considered by B.S.C. to be "unsatisfactorily vague because [the reply 
was] not expressly in terms requested." Id. B.S.C. required "unequivocal undertakings .... Your 
undertaking must encompass all B.S.C. documents in your possessirn without B.S.C. consent." Id. at 
16-17. 
145. Id. at 5-6. 
146. Id. at 17-18. In an affidavit, James Siddons, Director of the Secretariat for B.S.C., swore as 
follows: 
Id. 
On examination [of the documents] I found that a substantial number of the documents, I 
should say approximately 20%, had been mutilated in some way. Most of the mutilations 
consisted of the cutting off of the top left or right hand corners of documents, I presume for 
the purpose of ... excising manuscript markings on documents which may have given clues as 
to the identity of the person responsible for the removal of the documents from the plaintiff's 
[B.S.C.] offices. 
147. Id. at 6-7. 
148. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774. 
149. In its brief to the House of Lords, Granada argued that it was entitled to rely on the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and therefore could refuse to disclose the identity of its source, "because such 
disclosure would tend to increase the probability of Granada's [being] charged with and/or convicted of 
one or more criminal offenses." Brief for Granada Television Company at 18, British Steel, [1980] 3 
W.L.R. 774 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Granada]. Granada relied upon Rank Film Distributors v. 
Video Information Centre, [1981]2 W.L.R. 668, to support this argument. In Rank Film, the court held 
that the defendant's compliance with the plaintiff's request for the defendant's source would tend to 
incriminate the defendants of an offense under the Copyright Act of 1965. Id. 
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and that the court had the discretion to refuse to order disclosure of documents 
where disclosure would be in breach of some ethical or social value}50 Granada 
argued that the confidential relationship between the media and its sources of 
information was an ethical or social value which the court ought to protect by 
refusing to order disclosure}51 
The Chancery Division disposed of Granada's first contention by ruling that 
there was no chance that Granada could incriminate itself since there was no 
indication that criminal proceedings might result against both the source and 
Granada}52 The Chancellor, however, dealt at length with Granada's second 
contention. Granada claimed that it was in the public interest that the media not 
be forced to disclose their sources of information since such disclosure would 
impair the freedom and effectiveness of the press}53 However, the court, per 
Megarry, V.C., stated that Granada had no absolute privilege against disclosing 
the source of its information. 154 It held that the Newspaper Rule155 did not apply 
at the trial stage of a suit. 156 The court further held that it did not have the 
discretion to excuse the press from disclosing its source of information since no 
public interest in non-disclosure at the trial stage had been recognized in the 
law}57 For these and other reasons!5~ the court ordered that Granada serve to 
B.S.C. the names of all persons who supplied Granada with the documents 
belonging to B.S.C}59 The court granted leave to appeal the decision}60 
C. Court of Appeal DeCIsion 
The Court of AppeaP61 affirmed the Chancery Division holding, and, as a 
result, received criticism from both the press and some commentators. 162 The 
150. Brief for Granada, supra note 149, at 15-17. 
151. Granada cited the Vassall Inquiry Cases, see supra § HI, in its brief to the House of Lords to 
support this argument. Granada maintained that the cases were the first in which a court rejected the 
journalist's ethical duty to his source in order to forward the private interests of a plaintiff seeking the 
name of the source. See Brief for Granada, supra note 149, at 13-14. See also the National Union of 
Journalists' CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, cl. 7 (available from the National Union of Journalists, 
Acorn House, 314 Gray's Inn Road, London WCIX 8DP, England). The clause states: "A journalist 
shall protect confidential sources of information." Id. Clause 2(B) states: "A journalist shall at all times 
defend the principle of freedom of the press .... " /d. 
152. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 782-85. 
153. Brief for Granada at 12, British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774. 
154. Megarry cited the Clough, Mulholland, and Foster cases to support this conclusion. See British Steel, 
[1980] 3 W.L.R. at 786. 
155. See supra § II. 
156. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 786-87. 
157. Id. at 788-95. 
158. For a complete review of the Chancery Division's decision, see Press's Right not to Disclose Source of 
Information, 130 NEW L.J. 463 (1980). 
159. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 796 (1980). 
160. Id. 
161. /d. at 797-818. 
162. See The Press and the Public Interest, 130 NEW L.J. 426 (1980). "The decision of the court of 
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Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, expanded on Granada's claim that a respon-
sible press might be entitled not to disclose its sources. However, Denning 
supported B.S.C.'s request for disclosure of Granada's source of information. 163 
He wrote that, in general, newspapers should not be compelled to disclose their 
sources of information by means of discovery before trial or at the trial itself.1 64 
Thus, Denning appeared to be willing to stretch the applicability of the News-
paper Rule l65 to the British Steel case. Denning felt that if press sources are 
disclosed, then the press would be unable to report on illegalities in government 
since investigative journalism would "dry Up."166 He characterized the Vassall 
Inquiry Cases,167 in which the court ordered disclosure of news sources, as 
"exceptional."168 Denning qualified the "rule by which a journalist should not be 
compelled to disclose its source of information"169 by stating that journalists may 
refuse to disclose sources provided the journalist acts responsibly. 170 Denning 
believed that by mutilating B.S.C.'s documents Granada had forfeited its right 
not to disclose its source and had abused its power. 171 
One criticism of Denning's view regarding a responsible press is that although 
journalists may have a legal right not to disclose sources, that right is merely 
perfunctory; it is rarely recognized in practice. \ 72 Other critics have suggested 
that Denning's opinion left the law in a very uncertain state which would deter 
newspapers from informing the public of important issues. l73 Another commen-
tator suggested that the disclosure issue is too important to be treated as an 
equitable right that can be accorded only to journalists who come into court with 
clean hands. 174 After Denning's opinion was announced, Granada contended 
Appeal in Britisq Steel Corporation v. Granada Television Ltd. has been repudiated by the virtually 
unanimous verdict of the press and that of a number of [Members of Parliament] and other commen-
tators also. Our own verdict too must be one of rejection." /d. 
163. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 805-06. 
164. /d. at 804. 
165. See supra § ll. 
166. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 804. 
167. See supra § III. 
168. Bntish Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 805. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. Lord Denning wrote: "If a newspaper should act irresponsibly, then it forfeits its claim to 
protect its sources of information." Id. 
17i. Id. at 805-06. 
172. The Guardian of Manchester stated in an editorial: 
So the judgment leaves the law, once again, in a miserably unsatisfactory state. Newspapers and 
television companies, it says, have powerful immunities against disclosure of their sources, but 
these immunities are liable to fall away if ever they are invoked. The river is quite safe for 
swimming, apart from the alligators. 
The Guardian (Manchester), May 8, 1980, at 14, col. i. 
173. The Press and the Public Interest, 130 NEW L.J. 426-27 (1980). 
174. Tettenborg, The Press, Its Sources, and the Public Interest, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 5, 7 (1981). 
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that its program was responsibly made in the public interest. I 75 One year after he 
authored his Court of Appeal decision, Lord Denning wrote in his memoirs that 
he decided the case on an incorrect basis} 76 In retrospect, Denning stated that 
since only a Granada journalist knew the name of the source and had refused to 
reveal the name to Granada officials who did not know the name, it was not in 
the public interest for courts to order disclosure of the source} 77 These facts 
were not available to Denning when he authored his opinion. I 7B Denning con-
cluded that his opinion, and the opinion of the House of Lords, discredited the 
legal system in Britain because the courts attempted to enforce disclosure orders 
with which Granada could not comply.179 On reconsideration, Denning felt that 
Granada should not have been ordered to disclose its source. IBO 
D. House of Lords Decision 
Granada appealed the Court of Appeal decision to the House of Lords. The 
House of Lords dismissed Granada's appeal on July 30, 1980, but did not issue 
opinions until November 7,1980. The Lords' delay may have been an indication 
of the uncertainty surrounding the law of disclosure. IBI Critics believe, however, 
that what is most important about the House of Lord's decision is the refusal by 
three of the Law Lords to treat the case as even marginally connected with the 
freedom of the press. 182 For example, Lord Wilberforce believed that journalists 
have no immunity which protects them from the obligation to disclose sources 
upon cour~ order. IB3 He rejected Lord Denning's view that it was Granada's 
conduct which prevented Granada from invoking the privilege not to disclose 
confidential sources. 184 Lord Wilberforce also wrote that the British Steel case did 
175. Statement by Sir Dennis Forman, Chairman of Granada Television, Ltd., May 7, 1980. Forman 
made the statement in the form of a press release, which was obtained by this author from Norman 
Frisby of Granada Television, Ltd. Mr. Frisby stated that Mr. Forman's statement had not been 
reported accurately by the press in England. Letter from Norman Frisby (October 13, 1982) (discussing 
the British Steel case). 
176. A. DENNING, supra note 127, at 250·52. 
177.Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 251. Granada could not comply with B.S.C's request because the officials sued by B.S.C. 
did not know the name of the source. Only the reporter knew the name. He was not made a party to the 
suit and had refused to give the name of the source to Granada officials. Id. 
180. Id. at 251. 
181. The New Law Journal editorialized: 
Though willing to make public their decision on July 30, their Lordships then declined, for 
want of time in which to formulate them, to reveal the reasons for their decision. That they did 
only on November 7. Lord Salmon, more consistently, stated onJuly 30 that he had had time to 
formulate neither his decision nor his reasons, and handed down both together on November 
7. 
Confusion, supra note 125, at 1053. 
182. Hutchinson, Moles and Steel Papers, 44 MOD. L. REv. 320 (1981). 
183. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 822. 
184. Id. at 821. 
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not concern the freedom of the press because freedom of the press concerned 
only the laws of libel, prior-restraint, and censorship.ls5 For similar reasons, 
Lords Dilhorne and Russell agreed that the British Steel case did not involve the 
freedom of the press. lS6 
First, the Law Lords held that the Newspaper Rule could not be used by 
Granada to prevent disclosure of its source. IS7 Second, they interpreted the 
Vassalllnquiry Cases as indicating that journalists are not immune from disclos-
ing their sources. lSS Most importantly, the Law Lords held that when a plaintiff 
seeks disclosure of a source from a defendant, a court order to disclose the 
information is an equitable remedy which the court, in its discretion, may grant. 
The Law Lords upheld the Court of Appeal order that Granada disclose its 
source because they felt that B.S.C. had suffered a wrong. lS9 The ability of a 
court to exercise this discretion, according to the Lords/ 90 rests upon Norwich 
Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise. 191 That case established that 
English law places a duty upon a person to disclose the identity of a wrongdoer to 
a person who has been injured by the wrongdoing. 192 Lord Wilberforce held that 
the Norwich Pharmacal rule applied in British Steel because B.S.C. had established 
a cause of action against the source who supplied Granada with B.S.C.'s docu-
ments. 193 Lord Fraser agreed.194 Moreover, Lord Dilhorne considered that 
Granada was "clearly a wrongdoer, if not a thief."195 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 828-29. 
187. Id. at 830-33, 848-50, per Lords Dilhorne and Fraser respectively. 
188. Id. at 822-24, 831-33, 847-49, per Lords Wilberforce, Dilhorne, and Fraser, respectively. 
189. Id. at 827. 
190. Id. at 824-27, 834-36, 847, 850, per Lords Wilberforce, Dilhorne, and Fraser, respectively. 
191. [1973] 3 W.L.R. 164. 
192. Id. In its brief submitted to the House of Lords, B.S.C. contended that "the only novel feature of 
the [Norwich Pharmacal] case was the decision that disclosure could be obtained even from a party against 
whom there was no independent cause of action." Brief for British Steel Corporation at 6, British Steel, 
[1980] 3 W.L.R. 774. B.S.C. also asserted that it had a cause of action against Granada and that B.S.C. 
was unable to identify the source. Thus, B.S.C. contended that the Norwich Pharmacal remedy should be 
invoked. /d. 
Granada submitted in its brief to the House of Lords that the Norwich Pharmacal discretion should be 
employed in favor of Granada, since the discovery action would be used as a "weapon against the press." 
Brief for Granada, supra note 149, at 8. Granada also contended that the Norwich Pharmacal discovery 
remedy was intended to assist the party seeking information to find a legal action against a wrongdoer, 
but since B.S.C. intended only to fire the wrongdoer (a private action), discovery should not be 
ordered. Id. at 11. "That B.S.C. has no real intention to sue the source is further apparent from the fact 
that ... it has abandoned all its claims against Granada for damages, despite Granada's being in a better 
position than any possible source to meet such claims." Id. Granada contended in the alternative that the 
public interest in protecting press sources "indicates that discovery should be refused" since the court 
had the discretion to order discovery for the reasons stated in Norwich Pharm.acal. Id. 
193. British Steel, [1980] 3 W.L.R. at 826. 
194. /d. at 851. 
195. Id. at 835. 
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Critics of the House of Lords decision have suggested that the Lords applied 
the Norwich Pharmacal discretion theory to British Steel in order to avoid issues 
concerning disclosure and freedom of the press.196 Lord Wilberforce asserted 
that it was unnecessary for the court to consider issues concerning freedom of 
the press since B.S.C. could, had they acted in time, have obtained an injunction 
restraining Granada from publishing or reproducing any of the B.S.C. docu-
ments.197 
One Lord dissented in the British Steel case. 198 Lord Salmon felt that there was 
no reason why the Newspaper Rule should be confined to libel actions.199 He 
wrote that if B.S.C. had sued for libel, as it was entitled to given the nature of 
Granada's broadcast, then Granada could legally have refused to disclose its 
source.200 Instead, B.S.C. sued in an action for discovery. Lord Salmon felt that it 
was "absurd" that B.S.C. could overcome the Newspaper Rule by bringing an 
action for discovery.201 Salmon interpreted the Vassall Inquiry Cases as excep-
tional instances in which the security of the. state required disclosure of jour-
nalists' confidential sources of information.202 He wrote that the Norwich Phar-
macal case was distinguishable since the defendant in that case gave no promise 
of confidentiality, nor could the defendant or the public be prejudiced by the 
disclosure of the information, as was the case in British Steel. 203 
The House of Lords dismissed Granada's appeal and ordered the television 
company to disclose its confidential source.204 Granada officials refused to obey 
the House of Lords order and would have been sued for contempt but for the 
fact that the source revealed himself to journalists affiliated with the Times of 
London.205 B.S.C. subsequently dropped its claim against Granada, and Granada 
dropped its appeal in British ·Steel to the European Court of Human Rights,206 
thus terminating the case. 
196. See Hutchinson, supra note 182, at 320. 
197. British Steel, [1980)3 W.L.R. at 821. One commentator has stated that the rationale behind Lord 
Willberforce's belief "begs the question of what importance ought properly be accorded to the freedom 
of the press and more particularly to the public interest in disclosure." Confusion, supra note 125, at 
1054. 
198. British Steel, [1980) 3 W.L.R. at 836-46. 
199. Id. at 839. 
200. /d. 
201. /d. at 839-40. 
202. Id. at 841-42. "My Lords, I confess, with the greatest respect, that I cannot understand how it 
can be erroneous to hold that in [the Vassall Inquiry Cases) the disclosure of the identity of the 
journalist'S informant was ordered because the security of the state required it." Id. at 842. 
203. Id. at 843-44. 
204. Id. at 854. 
205. The source, Dougal Mackenzie, revealed himself to reporters with the Sunday Times (London), 
which published an "exclusive" full page story on why the so-called "mole" gave B.S.C.'s documents to 
Granada. See Why I Did It - By The Steel Mole, The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 2, 1980, at p. 15, 
col. 1. 
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VI. THE LAW OF DISCLOSURE AFrER BRITISH STEEL 
The British Steel case drew considerable criticism from the press in Britain. The 
press viewed the decision as impairing its ability to function freely in a demo-
cratic society.207 Critics have also suggested that the decision will have profound 
and far-reaching significance because of its impact on the ability of the press to 
withhold its sources and because of the negative effect this will have upon a free 
press.208 The fact that Lord Wilberforce and Lord Salmon reached conflicting 
interpretations of the law despite their reliance on similar precedent, principally 
the Newspaper Rule and the Vassallinquiry Cases, demonstrates that the law of 
disclosure continues to be poorly defined and consequently is susceptible to 
future conflicting interpretations.209 For example, British Steel would appear to 
stand for the proposition that journalists have no right in law to refuse to disclose 
their sources. In a subsequent case, however, the court of Criminal Appeal held 
that a journalist did not have to disclose his source210 because disclosure of the 
source was irrelevant to the litigation.211 Because the law of disclosure is uncer-
tain, other commentators have suggested that British Steel will have only a margi-
nally inhibitive effect on the press.212 The rationale behind this view is that since 
disclosure orders are within the judges' discretion, the judges will hesitate to 
order disclosure.213 
In order to clarify the law of disclosure and the law of contempt by which 
journalists who refuse to disclose sources are found guilty, Parliament enacted a 
revised Contempt of Court Act after the British Steel case.214 The Act states that 
the courts may not require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of 
contempt of court for refusing to disclose, a source of information contained in a 
publication unless the court establishes that disclosure is necessary in the inter-
ests of justice or national security.215 Lord Denning suggests that the Act leaves 
the law of disclosure as it was after the Vassaliinquiry Cases, and that the British 
Steel decision merely affirmed his judgment in those cases.216 He interprets the 
language of the Act, "necessary in the interests of justice,"217 as being a virtual 
207. In a leading editorial, the Times of London stated that in similar circumstances the newspaper 
would decline to disclose the name of its source and would suffer the legal consequences that might 
follow. The Times called the decision restrictive, reactionary, and dearly against the public interest. The 
Times (London), July 31, 1980, at 15, col. 1. 
208. Corifusitm, supra note 125, at 1053. 
209. Id. 
210. See Attorney-General v. Lundin, (1982) 75 Crim. App. 90 (Q.B.D.). 
211. /d. at 99. 
212. Tettenborg, supra note 174, at 6. 
213. Id. at 6-7. 
214. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49. 
215. Id. § 10. 
216. A. DENNING, supra note 127, at 252. 
217. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49, § 10. 
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repetition of his judgment in the Vassallinquiry Cases. 218 Because the Act leaves 
the law of disclosure holding that courts will order disclosure only in the interests 
of justice or national security, Denning asserts that in the future it will be very 
rare for the courts in England to order ajournalist to disclose a source.219 Courts 
will tend to respect the confidence which journalists give to sources of informa-
tion and will override obligations of confidence only when absolutely neces-
sary.220 Plaintiffs with merely vexatious or oppressive aims will not succeed in 
obtaining disclosure. 221 
Therefore, in England, plaintiffs seeking disclosure of a journalist's confiden-
tial source of information may base the disclosure argument on two principal 
grounds. First, the plaintiff may rely on the Vas sail Inquiry Cases and assert that 
the source should be disclosed for reasons of national security. Second, the 
plaintiff may assert that the source should be disclosed in the interests of justice. 
The second alternative was significantly expanded as a result of the British Steel 
decision.222 The Contempt of Court Act223 simply codifies the Vassall Inquiry 
Cases and the British Steel decision in this respect, leaving the law as it was after 
British Steel. 224 
The law of disclosure presently places journalists refusing to disclose a source 
in the position of being held in contempt of court if the court finds that the 
source should be disclosed in the interests of justice or national security.225 A 
journalist's promise to disobey a court order to reveal a source might reasonably 
be construed as a promise to submit to the consequences of such action.226 
However, imprisonment is not a satisfactory penalty for contempt.227 One of the 
undesirable aspects of imprisonment for contempt is that it makes martyrs. 228 
Proponents of the view that journalists should be privileged not to disclose their 
sources contend that the martyr problem underscores the need for extending 
preferential treatment to journalists.229 Proponents point to the special unde-
sirability of creating a profession which is capable of highlighting its martyrdom 
to the general public.230 But if journalists are to be granted a general privilege 
218. A. DENNING, supra note 127, at 252. 
219. [d. 
220. Tettenborg, supra note 174, at 7. Another commentator states that English courts endeavor not 
to demand that witnesses reveal more than they can in conscience reveal. See REpORTERS' PRIVILEGE 
WORLDWIDE, supra note 8, at 5. 
221. Tettenborg, supra note 174, at 7. 
222. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. 
223. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49. 
224. A. DENNING, supra note 127, at 252. 
225. Carter, supra note 12, at 1121-22. 
226. [d. at 1122. 
227. [d. 
228. [d. at 1123. 
229. [d. 
230. [d. 
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not to disclose sources of information, such a privilege should proceed from 
Parliament.231 Parliament had the opportunify to define the privilege in the 
Contempt of Court Act, but it chose to leave the law as it remained after British 
Steel. 232 A proposal for a shield law,233 made during debates on the Contempt of 
Court Act,234 was rejected because of Parliament's intransigence on the disclo-
sure issue.235 The proper way to deal with such an unsatisfactory sanction is to 
change it;236 it is not simply to exempt certain professional classes such as 
journalists from the law.237 In all cases in which disclosure has been ordered, 
journalists have argued that it is journalists who are privileged not to disclose 
sources. The courts have rejected this argument. The journalists' argument is 
perhaps flawed; the privilege should belong instead to sources and not to 
journalists.238 It is the sources who should have the privilege not to have their 
names revealed. 239 The disclosure issue would then center on whether infor-
mants have the right to insist that their identities, as the suppliers of information, 
be kept secret, notwithstanding the possibility of a denial of justice to an innocent 
party to legal proceedings.24o 
This argument carries weight, for informers should have the right to waive 
their own anonymity.241 By placing the right in the sources, their sense of 
security would be enhanced.242 Most importantly, by placing the right in infor-
mants through a statute, the courts would no longer deal with the disclosure 
issue on a discretionary basis. With clearly defined statutory bases for non-
disclosure, the law and its application would be more predictable in each case. 
The rationale of a law of privilege which places the right in the source would be 
similar to the rationale of the Newspaper Rule, which supports the right of 
sources to have their names withheld.243 By removing the court's discretion, and 
by supporting the right of informants to have their names remain silent, the law 
of disclosure would not directly impact journalists. Instead, it would directly 
impact sources. Thus, journalists could report on the news without questioning 
whether they may be forced to disclose the names of their sources of informa-
tion. 
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V II. CONCLUSION 
The law of disclosure in England remains unsettled due to the fact that judges 
have broad discretion whether to order disclosure. The Newspaper Rule indi-
cates that, at the interrogatory stage of libel actions, journalists have the right to 
refuse to disclose sources of information. The Vas sail Inquiry Cases demonstrate 
that journalists may not withhold their services from the government or the 
courts in the interest of national security. The British Steel holding expanded this 
concept by ordering disclosure in a civil suit where the object of the suit did not 
concern libel or national security. The Contempt of Court Act affirmed the 
holding of British Steel by stating that courts may order disclosure in the interests 
of justice. 
Thus, English courts have discretion to order disclosure on a case-by-case basis 
in the interests of 'justice." What constitutes justice is subject to many interpreta-
tions. For example, the courts in British Steel felt that it would be a denial of 
justice if B.S.C. could not have the name of its employee who supplied Granada 
with documents belonging to B.S.C. The law of disclosure, however, remains 
uncertain since a court has discretion to decide what constitutes justice and 
whether disclosure should be ordered to effect justice. For example, in British 
Steel, the courts could not identify any law which supported disclosure of the 
source. Consequently, the justices "made up" their own law. 244 
As a result, there is no predictability or stability with the present law. Alterna-
tively, it should be news sources, and not journalists, who should be able to claim 
the privilege not to have their names disclosed. Unless the anonymity of sources 
can be assured, they will no longer be willing to supply information to journalists. 
This would impede the free flow of information and consequently, the freedom 
of the press - a stronger argument than the journalists' position that they will 
not be able to report on the news unless they can assure sources that their names 
will not be revealed. If the courts in England discard what appears to be an 
entrenched discretionary policy ~n favor of vesting the right in the source, the 
law of disclosure could be clarified since it would be more predictable. Journalists 
could then report on the news without questioning whether they may later be 
forced to disclose the name of a source of information. The Parliament should 
change the law of disclosure in a revised Contempt of Court Act. 
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